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Introduction
Consider a huge database and a user who wants to query. We want the user to be able to query the
database while hiding the identity of the data-items she is after. Our aim is to hide the identity
of data-items, not the existence of interaction with the user. Applications could include patent
databases, stock quotes, media databases, etc.
In the basic model, Bob holds an n-bit string x (the database) and Alice wants to retrieve xi
while keeping i private (n is very large). We are interested in the communication complexity of the
protocol.
Using techniques from communication complexity, we can prove a lower bound of 1+logn bits
for any such protocol, without using the requirement of privacy. In fact, the simple protocol in
which Alice sends i and Bob sends back xi requires 1 + logn bits, but is not private.
The trivial solution is to let Bob send the entire string x to Alice, requiring n bits. (Note that
we are not concerned about the privacy of the database.) [CGKS95], who ﬁrst formulated the
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) problem, proved that we cannot do better: In any 1 − server
PIR with information theoretic privacy1, the communication is at least n bits.
This suggests two directions:
• Replicate the same database in k ≥ 2 servers: We provide unconditional privacy against t
(colluding) servers.
• Assume that Bob has bounded computational power: We provide computational privacy,
based on cryptographic hardness assumptions.
Related approaches
• Alice asks Bob for additional random queries: This still reveals a lot of information about i.
• Use secure multiparty computation techniques to compute the function xi = f(i,x) privately:
This is very ineﬃcient as the communication needed is polynomial in n.
• Anonymity: hides the identity of Alice, not the fact that xi is retrieved.
1For every possible content of the database, x and any two indices i and j, Bob should not be able to distinguish
between the case that Alice holds i and the case that Alice holds j, i.e., the communication between Alice and Bob
should be identically distributed, irrespective of the index i.
1• Oblivious Transfer: One-out-of-n oblivious transfer is similar to single server non-trivial PIR,
except that (a) the latter also requires the communication complexity to be less than n and
(b) the former requires Alice not to learn any information about the rest of the database.
An Information Theoretic PIR scheme
Suppose two (non-colluding) servers D0 and D1 hold the same database x. Alice picks a random
subset Q0 of [n] (i.e., {1,2,...,n}) by picking each element with probability 1
2. Let Q1 = Q0 ⊕ i
be obtained by complementing the presence of query bit, i in Q0 (i.e., include i if it is absent in Q0
and vice versa). Clearly Q1 is also a random subset. D0 gets Q0 (as a bit string) from Alice and
sends back the XOR of the bits with indices in Q0 (
L
j∈Q0 xj). D1 acts similarly. Alice obtains xi
by XOR-ing the bits received while neither database receives any information about i, as each gets
a uniformly distributed subset of [n]. Even though this scheme does not save any communication
compared to the trivial solution, it serves as a building block for more eﬃcient schemes.
We can obtain a O(
√
n) protocol with k = 22 = 4 databases, say, D00,D01,D10 and D11. Let
n = l2 and associate bits of x with a l∗l array A of bits. Let (i1,i2) be the desired entry in the array.
Alice chooses uniformly and independently random subsets Q0
1,Q0
2 ⊆ [l]. Deﬁne Q1
1 = Q0
1 ⊕ i1 and
Q1
2 = Q0
2 ⊕i2. Alice sends (Q1
σ1,Q2
σ2) to the database Dσ1σ2 which then sends back the XOR of all
bits in the rectangle deﬁned by (Q1
σ1,Q2
σ2) (
L
j1∈Q1
σ1, j2∈Q2
σ2 xj1j2). Alice obtains xi1i2 by XOR-ing
the four bits received. As each database gets a pair of uniformly distributed subsets of [l], the
scheme is private. The communication used is O(
√
n). These two schemes can be viewed as the
special cases of a protocol with k = 2d databases and communication O(2d.(d.
d √
n + 1)).
Known Communication Upper Bounds
Information theoretic PIR with k servers:
• 2 servers - O(
3 √
n) communication [CGKS95]
• k servers - O(n1/Ω(k)) communication [CGKS95, Amb97, BIKR02]
• logn servers - Polylog(n) communication [BF90, CGKS95]
Single server, computational PIR:
• Polylog(n) communication, using cryptographic hardness assumptions [CG97, KO97, CMS99]
Extensions
• PIR of Blocks: This is a more realistic model in which the data is partitioned into blocks
(or records) rather than single bits. Information theoretic PIR of blocks is discussed in
[CGKS95, CGN97].
• Private Information Storage: [OS97] give protocols for private reading and writing in both
information-theoretic and computational privacy models.
2• Symmetrical PIR [Aso01]: Alice should not be able to learn more than one record of the
database. Symmetrical (Database) privacy is important for practical applications (eg: billing
the user). This is very similar to one-out-of-n oblivious transfer, with limit on the communi-
cation used.
Discussion and Open Problems
• Access control and anonymity have somewhat contradictory objectives. How do we achieve
both simultaneously ?
• With more than one server, can we do better in computational PIR ? Can we reduce the
exponent (of logn in the polylog term) for a single server computational PIR protocol by
using more servers and the techniques from information-theoretic PIR ?
• Sublinear Computation: All existing protocols require high computation by the servers
(linear time per query). [BIM00] proposed the model of PIR with preprocessing, in which each
server is allowed to store polynomially many additional bits (by preprocessing x), which helps
it to answer each query with less computation. Apart from giving diﬀerent schemes, they
show that the expected computation of all the servers is at least n if no extra bits are stored
and is Ω(n/e) with e extra bits. As the size of the database in practical applications is huge,
it would be desirable to improve time complexity via preprocessing / amortization
/ oﬀ-line computation.
• Weaker notion of privacy: In information-theoretic as well as computational privacy
models, we require that the database should not learn any information about the query. Can
we relax this stringent requirement so as to improve the communication/time complexity ?
What is the right model of privacy for practical database problems ?
• PIR for a more general query: Can we do better than the trivial approach (i.e., retrieve
each bit involved in the query privately) for the following:
– Range queries: Eg: Find the number of ones in {xi,xi+1,...,xj}.
– Aggregation queries: Eg: Find the sum of the entries in a rectangle in a two dimen-
sional database.
– How to perform other SQL queries in a PIR fashion ?
• PIR by keywords: Typically the users access a database with keywords, which are then
internally translated by the database to physical addresses, using a search structure such as
binary tree or hash table. [CGN97] provide a scheme to privately access data by keywords, by
combining any search structure with any underlying PIR scheme. The user wants to privately
learn if its string is one of the keywords present in a data structure (in the database) and if
so, access the data it represents. How do we extend this model to more practical settings ?
• How can we query google in a privacy preserving manner ?
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